We propose an algorithm that, given an arbitrary N of unknown factorization and prime e ≥ N 1 4 +ε , certifies whether the RSA function RSAN,e(x) := x e mod N defines a permutation over Z * N or not. The algorithm uses Coppersmith's method to find small solutions of polynomial equations and runs in time O(ε −8 log 2 N ). Previous certification techniques required e > N .
Introduction
One of the most well known cryptographic primitives is the RSA function [RSA78] . Given a public modulus N (which is usually the product of two primes) and an exponent e, it is defined as RSA N,e : Z * N → Z * N , x → x e mod N . It is well known that the RSA function defines a permutation over the domain Z * N iff gcd(e, ϕ(N )) = 1. Furthermore, with the right choice of parameters, the RSA function even defines a trapdoor permutation since the prime factorization of N allows to efficiently invert RSA N,e .
Trapdoor permutations have many applications to public-key cryptosystems and serve as a building block for (often quite complex) cryptographic protocols. In a large number of applications of trapdoor functions, the fact that the function is a permutation is required to be publicly verifiable. The importance of trapdoor permutations with an efficient permutation checking procedure was first noted by Bellare and Yung [BY93, BY96] , who called them certified trapdoor permutations. Certified trapdoor permutations are in particular important in scenarios where one party (for example, the prover) sends a description of a trapdoor permutation to another party (for example, the verifier). A dishonest prover may send a malicious description of a trapdoor function which is not a permutation. If this remains unnoticed by the verifier, it may allow the prover to cheat in the protocol. See Section 1.2 for a list of applications of certified trapdoor permutations.
RSA as a certified trapdoor permutation. The question whether the RSA function is a certified trapdoor permutation was first addressed by Bellare and Yung who wrote in [BY93, BY96] :
In particular, RSA is (probably) not certified [...] . This is because [...] the (description of ) the trapdoor permutation f includes a number which is a product of two primes, and there is (probably) no polynomial time procedure to test whether or not a number is a product of two primes.
To overcome this problem, Bellare and Yung showed that every trapdoor permutation can be transformed into a certified trapdoor permutation by presenting pre-images (under the function) of random elements specified in a common reference string (CRS), hence certifying that the function is (almost) a permutation. While this result is certainly interesting at a theoretical level, the Bellare-Yung transformation has two main disadvantages. First, it comes with an additional computational overhead (consisting of a number of evaluations of the function) and is therefore relatively inefficient. Second, in order to keep the same data structures one would rather prefer that the initial trapdoor function (e.g., RSA) can be certified directly, without any additional overhead such as a CRS or pre-images. Related transformations for RSA were proposed in [GMR98, CM99, CPP07] . Subsequently, two results were obtained about the direct certifiability of RSA, i.e., without using a CRS and expanding the public description. First, [CMS99, LMRS04] observed that if e > N and e is prime, then the RSA function RSA N,e is a certified permutation. (This is, since if e is a prime, then it can never divide ϕ(N ) < N and hence gcd(e, ϕ(N )) = 1.) However, choosing e > N is usually avoided in practice due to the costs for modular exponentiation. Second, Kiltz et al. [KOS10] noted that if e < N 1/4 , then RSA N,e is a lossy trapdoor permutation [PW08] (under the phi-Hiding Assumption [CMS99] ) and hence it cannot be certified. This is because a lossy trapdoor permutation is in some sense the opposite of a certified trapdoor permutation: a honestly generated (N, e) with N = pq and gcd(e, ϕ(N )) = 1 cannot be efficiently distinguished from (N, e) for which RSA N,e is many-to-1 and hence not a permutation.
To summarize, if e < N 1/4 , then the RSA function is lossy and cannot be certified (unless the phihiding assumption is wrong); if e > N , then it is certified [CMS99, LMRS04] ; if N 1/4 < e < N , nothing is known and therefore generic Bellare-Yung NIZK proofs [BY96] have to be added to certify RSA.
Our Results
In this work we close the above gap by showing an efficient certification procedure that works for any prime exponent e > N 1/4 . Concretely, we construct an algorithm that, given an arbitrary modulus N (with unknown factorization) and a prime e ≥ N 1/4+ε , returns 1 iff RSA N,e defines a permutation over
The running time of the algorithm is O(ε −8 log 2 (N )) bit operations plus additional O(log 4 N ) if e needs to be checked for primality.
Our Certification Algorithm. The idea of our new certification algorithm is as follows. The RSA N,e function defines a permutation over Z * N iff e does not divide ϕ(N ). Hence given N, e, our goal is to identify if gcd(e, ϕ(N )) = 1 or not. First, we use Coppersmith's algorithm [Cop96, May10] to find prime divisors p of N in a specific range. Concretely, our algorithm FindFactor run with parameter β successfully identifies if a given prime e > N 1/4+ε divides p − 1 iff there exists a divisor
we could assume that N = pq is the product of two primes, both of size roughly N 1/2 , then we could run FindFactor with parameter β = 1/2 to identify whether e divides ϕ(N ) or not. However, the certification algorithm has to view N as an arbitrary integer with unknown factorization. If N = pq with p ≈ N 2/3 and q ≈ N 1/3 , then FindFactor run with parameter β = 1/2 does not work any more. To get around this, we run the FindFactor algorithm multiple times (with different parameters β) to check for various ranges of the prime factors of N . Our main technical contribution is to show that the number of invocations of FindFactor in our certification algorithm is poly(ε) if e ≥ N 1/4+ε .
Extensions. Our certification algorithm works only for prime e but it can be extended to the case where the factorization of e = e zi i is known. In that case we can give an efficient certification procedure if e i ≥ N 1/4+ε , for all i. If, for one i, we have e i < N 1/4 , then RSA N,e is (at least) e i -to-1 (lossy) under the phi-hiding assumption. Extending our methods to work with arbitrary integers e of unknown factorization remains an open problem.
Certified Trapdoor Permutations and Applications
The only known candidate trapdoor permutations are the (factoring-based) Blum-Blum-Shub permutation [BBS86] , the RSA permutation [RSA78] , and Paillier [Pai99] . Since the Blum-Blum-Shub function is lossy assuming one cannot distinguish N = pq from N = pqr [MY10, FGK
+ 10], the RSA trapdoor function is the most efficient certified trapdoor permutation currently known. Our results show that one can use RSA with prime e = N 1/4+ε (rather than e > N ) as a certified trapdoor permutation. We now mention a number of cryptographic protocols that are using certified (rather than standard) trapdoor permutations as a building block. Most importantly, NIZK protocols for any NP-statement can be built from (doubly-enhanced) certified trapdoor permutations [FLS90, Gol11, Gol01, Gol04] . Since the RSA trapdoor permutation is doubly-enhanced [Gol11] we obtain simplified and more efficient NIZK protocols from the RSA assumption (with e > N 1/4 ), that do not suffer from the Bellare-Yung certification overhead. Apart from that, [DN00] used certified trapdoor permutations to construct ZAPS and verifiable PRFs; [GRS + 11] to construct round-optimal blind signatures; [LMRS04, BNN07] to build sequential aggregate signatures. We stress that requiring the trapdoor permutation to be certified is not only an artifact of the security proofs. In almost all cases the use of a lossy trapdoor permutation leads to a concrete attack on the scheme. For example, the security of the RSA-based aggregate signatures scheme of [LMRS04] can be broken (assuming the Phi-Hiding Assumption) when instantiated with e < N 1/4 (e.g., using the common choices e = 3 or e = 2 16 + 1). The same holds for the NIZK protocols for any NP statement [Gol11] . Recently, [KK12] showed that a full-domain hash impossibility result by Coron [Cor00] only holds if the trapdoor function is certified.
Definitions

Notation
We denote our security parameter as k. For all n ∈ N, we denote by 1 n the n-bit string of all ones. For any element x in a set S, we use x ∈ R S to indicate that we choose x uniformly at random from S. We denote the set of prime numbers by P and the set of n-bit prime numbers by P n . We denote by Z * N = {x ∈ Z N : gcd(x, N ) = 1} the multiplicative group modulo an integer N . All logarithms are base 2 unless otherwise stated.
Families of Permutations
Definition 2.1 A family of permutations P = (Gen, Eval) consists of the following two polynomial-time algorithms.
1. A probabilistic algorithm Gen, which on input 1 k outputs a public description pub which includes an efficiently sampleable domain Dom pub .
2. A deterministic algorithm Eval, which on input pub and x ∈ Dom pub , outputs y ∈ Dom pub . We write f (x) = Eval(pub, x).
We require that for all k ∈ N and all pub output by Gen(1 k ), Eval(pub, ·) defines a permutation over Dom pub .
Definition 2.1 extends to families of trapdoor permutations, where Gen additionally outputs a trapdoor trap which can be used by a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm Invert to compute f −1 (y), for any y ∈ Dom pub .
We want to point out that Eval(pub, ·) is only required to be a permutation for correctly generated pub but not every bit-string pub yields a permutation. A family of permutations Π is said to be certified [BY96] if the fact that it is a permutation can be verified in polynomial time given pub. Definition 2.2 CP = (Gen, Eval, Certify) is called a family of certified permutations if (Gen, Eval) is a family of permutations and Certify is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that, on input of 1 k and an arbitrary pub (potentially not generated by Gen), returns 1 iff Eval(pub, ·) defines a permutation over Dom pub . Definition 2.2 also extends to families of certified trapdoor permutations.
We remark that Definition 2.2 follows [LMRS04] and is slightly weaker than that of Bellare and Yung [BY96] , where, for all inputs, the Certify algorithm is required to return 1 iff pub was generated by Gen(1 k ), with some constant error probability (in the sense of a BPP algorithm). 1 In fact, it seems that the certification constructions by Bellare and Yung [BY96, Section 3] only meet our weaker definition which is, in particular, sufficient for their applications to NIZK for all NP languages.
RSA trapdoor permutation
In Figure 1 we give a description of a family of trapdoor permutations RSA γ = (RSAGen γ , RSAEval, RSAInvert), parametrized by some function γ > 0 (which controls the size of the exponent e ≈ N γ ). The domain is defined as Dom pub = Z * N . 
RSA Certification Algorithm
In this section we will give a certification algorithm for the RSA trapdoor permutation RSA γ from Section 2.3. Our algorithm can be derived from the following main theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let N be an integer of unknown factorization and e < N be a prime integer such that γ = log N e = 1 4 + ε and gcd(e, N ) = 1. We can decide if gcd(e, ϕ(N )) = 1 or gcd(e, ϕ(N )) = e in time O(ε −8 log 2 N ).
Proof: Let us write
Since e is prime, we can only have gcd(e, ϕ(N )) = 1 or gcd(e, ϕ(N )) = e. In the last case, we must have e|ϕ(N ). If e > N then we know that gcd(e, ϕ(N )) = 1 [LMRS04] . When e < N , then we need to perform some further checks.
Let us look at the case e|ϕ(N ). If e|p zi−1 i then gcd(e, N ) = e, which contradicts the prerequisite that e and N are coprime. Hence we must have e|(p i − 1) for some i. Let us denote p = p i . There exists an x 0 ∈ N s.t.
ex 0 + 1 = p.
Our goal is to recover x 0 and thus to find p. Notice that x 0 is a small root of the polynomial equation
This allows us to use Coppersmith's algorithm for finding small roots of modular polynomial equations. A proof can be found in [May10] .
We use Coppersmith's algorithm to find prime divisors p of N in a specific range as specified in the following lemma. If FindFactor cannot find a non-trivial factor of N , it outputs ⊥.
Proof: Since e|p − 1, we have ex 0 = p − 1 for some x 0 ∈ N. Thus the polynomial f (x) = ex + 1 has the root x 0 modulo p. Multiplication of f (x) by e −1 modulo N gives us a monic polynomial with the same root modulo p. Let us bound the size of our desired root x 0 . We have
Thus we can recover x 0 by Theorem 3.2 in time O(µ −7 log 2 N ). Also by Theorem 3.2, the number of candidates for x 0 is bounded by O(µ −1 ). For every candidate we check whether gcd(ex 0 + 1, N ) gives us the divisor p. This can be done in time O(µ −1 log 2 N ), which concludes the proof.
Lemma 3.3 can be used to check whether e|p − 1 for some prime divisor p in the range [N β , N
Our goal is to check whether e|p − 1 for some p in the entire range [e, N ], which we will call the target range.
Obviously p ≤ N . Thus, we can set the upper bound to β 2 + γ − µ = 1. This in turn implies a lower bound of β = 1 − (γ − µ). Hence, we can first search for a divisor p in the interval [N
we do not find a divisor p in this interval, then we know that any divisor p must satisfy p ≤ N Proof: Since by definition γ ≤ β i ≤ 1 for all i and µ > 0, we have β i − (γ − µ) > 0 and therefore
We now show by induction that the sequence of the β i is monotone decreasing. Let us start with β 1 < β 0 . Since β 0 − (γ − µ) < 1, we have max{ β 0 − (γ − µ), γ} < 1 and therefore β 1 < β 0 .
Our inductive hypothesis is β i ≤ β i−1 for all i ≤ n. Now β n ≤ β n−1 implies
and therefore by monotonicity of the square root function
This yields max{ β n − (γ − µ), γ} ≤ max{ β n−1 − (γ − µ), γ}. Thus, β n+1 ≤ β n .
Since the sequence of the β i is monotone decreasing and bounded below by γ, it converges. Now we show that we can upper bound the number k − 1 of intervals [β i , β i−1 ], 1 ≤ i < k for which β i > γ. This implies that our sequence stabilizes after k steps at the point β k = γ.
Let us define a function ∆(β i−1 ) = β i−1 − β i ≥ 0, which gives us the length of the i th interval. For β i > γ we obtain ∆(β i−1 ) = β i−1 − β i−1 − (γ − µ). Since the first two derivatives of ∆(β) satisfy
an easy computation shows that ∆(β) achieves its minimum at the point β (0) = 1 4 + γ − µ. Therefore, each interval length is of size at least
This in turn means that the number k − 1 of intervals with β i > γ is at most
, which concludes the proof. We now discuss the choice of the parameter µ. Lemma 3.3 gives us the condition µ ≤ β i /7 for all values of i. We know from the proof of Lemma 3.4 that γ ≤ β i for all values of i. Hence it is sufficient to pick µ such that µ ≤ γ/7.
Furthermore, from Lemma 3.4 we have the condition µ < γ − We give the whole algorithm GCDDecide for deciding whether gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1 in Figure 3 .
It remains to determine the running time t GCDDecide of GCDDecide. We know from Lemma 3.4 that we need at most (1 − γ)/(γ − µ − Since each iteration takes time O(µ −7 log 2 N ), we obtain
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
We now describe our full certification algorithm RSACertify that certifies the RSA trapdoor permutation RSA γ from Section 2.3, for γ = 1/4+ε. Note that we assume in Theorem 3.1 that e is prime and that gcd(e, N ) = 1. If we want to check these prerequisites, we have an additional overhead of O(log 4 N ) for the primality test on e and O(log 2 N ) for the GCD computation. The complete certification algorithm RSACertify is described in Figure 3 . The total running time of RSACertify, denoted by t RSACertify , is given by the expression Let CRSA γ = (RSAGen γ , RSAEval, RSAInvert, RSACertify), as described in Figures 1 and 3 , where γ controls the size of e ≈ N γ . By Theorem 3.1 we can see that, for any γ = 1/4 + 1/poly(k), CRSA γ defines a family of certified trapdoor permutations with respect to Definition 2.2.
